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1 Introduction
Herding in nancial markets has been explored extensively in recent years.1 The main focus has
been on forms of rational herding: informational herding, reputation-based and compensation-
based herding. In this paper we conne our attention to informational herding in nancial
markets. We demonstrate that ambiguity can cause the occurrence of herding, as well as
contrarian behaviour.
Ambiguity, rst dened by Knight (1921), refers to situations where subjective probabilities
are not perfectly known or even unknown. Ambiguity arises from sources such as missing infor-
mation or disagreement of expert opinions or the lack of condence on the information quality.
Cumulative evidence from laboratory experiments has suggested that behaviour under ambigu-
ity is di¤erent from behaviour under risk, such as the Ellsberg Paradox (1961): see, for example,
Camerer and Weber (1992). It has been argued that nancial market is a likely candidate for
considering the e¤ects of ambiguity. In this paper, we consider ambiguity concerning an assets
trading value. As suggested in Hirshleifer (2001), such ambiguity could be either about the
assets fundamental volatility or lack of condence in the quality of information regarding the
value of the asset. In this paper, we model investorspreference when facing such ambiguity
and suggest a non-neutral attitude to such ambiguity as a cause of herding and contrarian
behaviour.
The market structure of our theoretical framework, focuses on the acquisition of new infor-
mation by informed traders: through the prevailing market price of the asset and by a private
signal about the values of the asset that is being traded.2 We modify the existing paradigm by
introducing the notion of uncertainty or ambiguity, but where uncertainty is captured by non-
additive beliefs (Schmeidler (1989)). In e¤ect, informed traders are assumed to be uncertain
about the probabilities (as in Knight (1921)) governing the realisation of the value of the asset
that is being traded.
1Hirshleifer and Teoh (2003) provide an overview of the recent theoretical and empirical research on this topic.
2Our model follows that developed by Bikhchandani, Hirshleifer and Welch (1992), based on the work of
Glosten and Milgrom (1985), which itself is a derivative of that of Copeland and Galai (1983). This type of
framework has featured in one form or another in much of the subsequent literature, including the inuential
paper by Avery and Zemsky (1998).
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The model of decision-making under uncertainty we use is Choquet expected utility (hence-
forth CEU) which is due to Schmeidler (1989). In this model, individualsbeliefs are represented
as capacities (non-additive beliefs).
Experiments on decision-making under risk (i.e. with known probabilities) have shown that
individuals tend to overweight both high and low probability events. This can be explained by
insensitivity of perception in the middle of the range on probabilities. For instance, di¤erence
from 0.55 to 0.60 is not perceived to be as great as that between 0 and 0.05. It has been argued
that the decision weights assigned to events are an inverse S-shaped function over the "given"
probabilities of occurrence of those events (see, Gonzalez and Wu (1999), Abdellaoui (2000),




1 for P = 1
+ (1  )  P for 0 < P < 1
0 for P = 0
(1)
where (P ) denotes the weight the event is given in decisions and (; ) 2 [0; 1]:
If probabilities are not known, then we have a problem of decision-making under ambiguity.
In this case a similar phenomena has been found (see, Kilka and Weber (2001)). Individuals
do not assign subjective probabilities to events. Instead they overweight both highly likely and
highly unlikely events. (In this case the likelihood of events is subjective.) Chateauneuf, Eich-
berger and Grant (2008) axiomatised such decision-making under ambiguity. They show that
preferences may be represented as a Choquet integral with respect to a neo-additive capacity.
A neo-additive capacity is analogous to the piecewise linear function in equation (1) but applies
to uncertainty rather than risk.
We shall make the assumption that is dominant in the literature on sequential trading
models that a given agent is risk-neutral, so that the function which maps outcomes into utility
is linear. Together with the assumption of CEU preferences with beliefs represented as neo-
additive capacities, this implies that preferences may be represented as a weighted average of
the expected value of utility, the maximum value of utility and the minimum value of utility.
This is expressed as,
Max (w) + (1  )Min (w) + (1  )Ew; (2)
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where Max (w) (resp. Min(w)) is the maximum (resp. minimum) value of, say, trading an
asset, in our model, and Ew is the expected value of trading an asset given the set of relevant
probabilities, .3 The neo in the capacity epitomises the fact it is a non-extreme-outcome
additive capacity.
Knight (1921) maintained that agents di¤er in their attitudes to ambiguity. The majority of
people are ambiguity-averse, behaving more cautiously when probabilities are undened, while
a signicant minority of individuals appear to be the opposite, being ambiguity-loving (see the
experimental evidence in Camerer and Weber (1992)). In CEU , agents are ambiguity-averse if
they put more weight on "bad" outcomes than do EU maximisers, while they are ambiguity-
loving if they put more weight on "good" outcomes. We dene ambiguity-averse behaviour as
pessimism (optimism) when they place more weight on the possibly low (high) value of an asset.
As our focus is the acquisition of new information and its impact on prior (public or market)
beliefs about the value of the asset, it is necessary to formulate a process by which those beliefs
are up-dated. We view ambiguity-attitude () as a characteristic of the individual, while beliefs
and perceived ambiguity about beliefs are factors which can depend on the environment. Thus
we believe an updating rule should preserve ambiguity-attitude (), while revising beliefs and
ambiguity as new information is received. Other desirable features of an updating rule are that
it should coincide Bayesian updating for additive beliefs and that it should preserve dynamic
consistency.
There are a number of proposals which extend Bayesian updating to ambiguous beliefs.
These include the optimistic rule, the Dempster-Shafer rule (Gilboa and Schmeidler (1993));
the Generalised Bayesian Update (henceforth, GBU), Eichberger, Grant and Kelsey (2007);
and recursive multiple priors (Epstein and Schneider (2003)). When applied to neo-additive
capacities both the Optimistic and Dempster-Shafer updates revise ambiguity-attitude () as
well as beliefs. In contrast, the GBU does not change ambiguity attitude and just revises beliefs.
For this reason we use the GBU. Of the rules described, only recursive multiple priors satisfy full
dynamic consistency. However as we shall argue in the conclusions, given our market framework,
these potential dynamic inconsistencies do not create any problems for our analysis.4
3The parameters  and  may be measured experimentally, see Kilka and Weber (2001).
4We do not consider recursive multiple priors in this paper since it was developed for a di¤erent framework;
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Using neo-additive capacities to capture uncertainty about information, either on behalf
of the informed trader, we are able to demonstrate that herd and contrarian behaviour can
occur. That behaviour only deviates SEU to allow for ambiguity; and so contrasts with the
claims of others (such as, Shleifer and Summers (1990 and Kirman (1993)). Indeed, there is
a range of market (public) expectations of the value of the asset being traded over which such
behaviour can occur. Furthermore, herd and contrarian behaviour arise under the same set
of information about the alternative values that the asset can take and the arrival of private
signals of informed traders about the probabilities of those values. Therefore, we do not require
di¤erent informational frameworks to see the possibility of either kind of behaviour, as do, for
example, Avery and Zemsky (1998).
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we provide a simple ex-
ample to illustrate some of the points made above and to provide a context for our paper.
Section 3 outlines the Glosten-Milgrom market micro structure that we use and the informa-
tional properties that we consider in our analysis of herd and contrarian behaviour. In section
4, we note some basic principles of ambiguity theory, and present the neo-additive capacity and
its updating. Section 5 provides (conventional) denitions of herding/contrarian behaviour.
We demonstrate the possibility of contrarian and herd behaviour in our framework. Section 6
provides some illustrative observations on the path of prices in a phase of herd selling and how
it can be ended by an informed trader with a high signal and a high degree of optimism or
attitude to ambiguity. Section 7 contains some concluding observations, in the course of which
we comment on the absence of money pumps and dynamic inconsistency in our framework.
2 A Simplied Example
We consider a market in which an asset is traded whose intrinsic value (w) is unknown, but is
known to be either 1 or 0. (This is a maintained assumption throughout the paper.) Let there
be informed traders in the market who receive private signals (x), insider information, about
which of those two values is correct. They receive those signals, "high" and "low", with the
one with an innite horizon rather than two periods and multiple priors rather than CEU preferences. However,
we do not believe that these di¤erences are crucial and it would be possible to prove similar results to ours using
the recursive multiple priors model.
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probabilities given in Table 1. So, the probability of either signal occurring and conveying the
intrinsic worth of the asset is p (where it is assumed that p > 1=2).
Table 1
Signal probabilities
P (x = hjw) P (x = ljw)
w = 1 p 1  p
w = 0 1  p p
Suppose that from the past history of trades and prices on the market, the "market" expec-
tation of the value of the asset is , namely, the probability that the value is 1. Suppose also
that in the absence of a signal the (potentially informed) trader will take that belief as the basis
of his decision to purchase or sell the asset given the bid and ask prices of the market maker.
Let the next trader on the market receive a high signal and suppose that he decides whether
to buy or sell the asset, or not to trade, according to his expected utility of the asset; his actual
utility being a linear function of the assets value. So, his expected utility then is his estimate
of the probability that the assets value is 1. Assume for the sake of argument that the market
maker sets his price at  (hence we ignore bid and ask prices at this stage). Let the informed
trader apply this extra information to revise the markets probability that the assets value is 1









will exceed , so that the asset will be purchased. The informed trader acts
according to his signal, whatever has been happening to the recent history of the market price
of the asset.
By contrast, now assume that the trader is uncertain about the up-dated probability dened
in equation (3), perhaps because he does not have full condence in, feels ambiguous about,
the inside information that he has acquired. He will then also lack condence in the updated
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probability 0: Suppose preferences can be represented by
 + (1  )E0w;
which is in the spirit of the CEU representation in equation (2). It is immediate that this
revised expected value (utility) might be lower than ; to take the simplest example, as ! 0
and  ! 1, expected utility ! 0. In this situation the trader ignores his high signal and does
not purchase the asset: in fact, he sells the asset to the market maker. The su¢ cient condition
for such an outcome is:  > 1+ (  1). The same occurrence can arise if the informed trader
accepts p intrinsically, but has doubts about . These doubts (or ambiguities) are represented
by the CEU , equation (2). Then again, for example, as  ! 0 and  ! 1, the greater is the
chance that the CEU will be lower than , for any value of the latter.
Such overriding of his private signals due to information ambiguity by the informed trader is
the generator of herd and contrarian behaviour. However, the above is only illustrative, since it
lacks a rigorous formal framework. Importantly, it relies upon an ad hoc evaluation of what are,
in terms of our observations in the Section 1, unknown probabilities and, therefore, of subjective
features of the trader. The aim of the remainder of the paper is to rectify these deciencies.
3 Market Micro Structure
Market Mechanism. As in Glosten and Milgrom (1985) a risky asset is exchanged for money
among market makers and two types of traders, informed and uninformed. The true value
of the asset is w 2 f0; 1g. Trading occurs sequentially and one trader (who can be of either
type) is randomly selected in each period. There is an innite sequence of traders indexed by
t = 0; 1; 2; :::. This sequence can be thought of as one of time periods. MMs set the prices at
which they will trade at the beginning of each trading period, when the selected trader can buy
or sell a unit of the asset or not trade, after which he must exit the market.
Traders. Informed traders receive a private signal concerning the value of the asset. In the
mainstream literature they base their trading decision on their expected utility (value) of the
asset, whereas here they do so according to their CEU of the asset. The trading decisions of the
uninformed traders do not concern us and we use traders as a shorthand for informed traders.
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The private signals (x), noted above, that are received by informed traders are identical to
those proposed by Bikhchandani, Hirshleifer and Welch (1992), being two in number: x 2 fh; lg;
indicating that the value of the asset is "high" (h) or "low" (l). Their probabilities are given
in Table 1, and we recall that it is assumed that p > 1=2: Intuitively, signal l is more likely
when w = 0 and it can be interpreted as a "Bearish" signal. Similarly, x = h can be interpreted
as a "Bullish" signal. We have these expected values of the asset: E [wjx = l] < E [w] <
E [wjx = h]. These signals have been labelled "value uncertainty" by Avery and Zemsky (1998):
their "monotonic signals". They, e¤ectively, can be seen as dening signals that cannot produce
herd or contrarian behaviour given the assumed objective of the informed trader.5
Market Makers. As argued in Chari and Kehoe (2003), including market makers is a convenient
way of modelling trade between informed and uninformed traders. We assume, in accord with
the literature upon which we are drawing, that there is nite number of long-lived risk-neutral
market makers under Bertrand competition (Easley and OHara (1987)). Market makers make
money from the uninformed traders but lose money to the informed traders, but due to Betrand
competition they make zero expected prot (utility). They base their prices on the markets
belief as to the value of the asset.
Market belief concerning the assets value. Traders act sequentially and observe Ht; the history
of actions (trades and their type) and prices (bid, ask), up until time t (the appearance of
the market of trader t). We dene t1 = P (w = 1jHt) as the market belief at time t, the
probability in e¤ect, that the value is high, conditional on the market history Ht: This is the
expectation, taken at the end of trader (t   1)s trading; of the value of the asset that will
underlie the trading environment when trader t comes to the market. For any given traders
action a 2 fs; b; ng ; where s represents selling, b buying, and n no trading, the markets belief







1). Those prices histories, of course, could last for longer periods so that,
5Avery and Zemsky (1998) introduced a further layer of uncertainty, what they call "event uncertainty"
following the nance literature where this was rst introduced by Easley and OHara (1987) (see, also Easley
and OHara (1992)). They combine the two types of uncertainty to produce non-monotonic signals and thereby
herding behaviour. They also introduce the notion of "composition uncertainty" which when combined with
value uncertainty can lead to contrarian behaviour.
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1 < :::). We refer, more appropriately, to such histories again under
the market makersbelief and price-setting below.
Private belief. An informed trader at given t receives a private signal concerning the value
of the asset in addition to the public information t1. He then updates the probabilities that
the value is high (t1) or low (1   t1), employing the standard Bayesian rule on conditional
probabilities; so that in the former instance, the up-dated probability is given by equation (3).
However the trader lacks condence in these updated beliefs. We use neo-additive capacities
to model this lack of condence. He then decides upon his trading strategy on the basis of the
(signal-updated) CEU of the asset, given the market makers bid and ask prices.6
Market Makers belief and price-setting. We follow most (but not all of the literature) in as-
suming that the MMs do not receive private signals about the value of the asset and have only
the same information as that in the public domain. In the sequential trading model, as Glosten
and Milgrom (1985) demonstrated, the stochastic prices at which transactions take place follow
a Martingale process, with respect to the market makers information. Consequently, the mar-
kets expected value of the asset for some period (trader) t, will equal the price at which the
asset has just been traded on the market, its current price. That is, t1 = P (w = 1jHt), will
be set at that current price. However, in accord with most of the literature, it is assumed that
they and market participants know that a private signal will always have been received by any
informed trader who is selected to trade at each point in time. Then they must set a bid-ask
spread around t1 (see, for example, Glosten and Milgrom (1985)). Nevertheless, the spread is
frequently overlooked or ignored in the literature; with authors taking t1, the traders expected
value of the asset, as the price of the asset, or taking it to be approximately so. We do not
adopt that procedure and consider bid and ask prices: in this way the possibilities of no trade
thereby are highlighted.
Bid and Ask prices. The ask price is the price at which the market maker will sell the asset
to a potential buyer. In the absence of ambiguity the market maker is concerned solely with
6We note that we follow the published literature and assume that there are no transactions costs. Additionally,
we note that papers by Romano (2006) and Cipriani and Guarino (2006) consider aspects of transactions costs
in the Glosten-Milgrom model; though not in our framework.
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maximising expected prot (or its expected utility). This implies that he will set the ask price
so that it equals his expected value (utility) of the asset, should the next trader be a purchaser
of the asset. In that way he can make up for the fact that he will gain on average from the
uninformed traders but will lose out on average to the informed traders. Consequently, given
Bertrand competition, the expected prot (or utility) from a sale or a purchase will be zero
(Easley and OHara (1987)). Since all market makers have the same market information and
hence prior belief , the market makers can calculate each others optimal prices: consequently,
they must also quote the same ask and bid prices. The market makers expected value of the
asset must turn out to be what he sold it for, or what he paid for it. If we assume to begin with
that he is concerned with the expected value of the asset then he will set the ask price (At)
equal to his expectation of the assets value consequent upon a purchase by the next trader.
That is:
At = E[wt j b] = wlP [w = wl j b] + whP [w = wh j b] : (4)
Here: wl and wh are the two, low and high, values of the asset; P denotes probability; and b
denotes the decision to buy by the trader t. Given that wl = 0, its component in At is otiose
here. Of course, P [w = wh j b] is the probability that the value of the asset is high if the market
makers trade in the next period should be a sale.
From BayesRule:
P [w = 1 j b] = P [w = 1]P [b j w = 1]
P [w = 1]P [b j w = 1] + P [w = 0]P [b j w = 0] : (5)
The conditional probabilities in (5) depend obviously (OHara (1997)) on these probabilities:
(i) that the trader will be informed or uniformed ; (ii) that the informed trader will have received
a signal; (iii) of any high (low) signal, p and (1   p), respectively, should a signal have been
received; (iv) that the informed trader will buy given the receipt of either signal; and, (v) that
the uninformed trader will buy a unit of the asset at the ask price when the value is high or
low.
Assumptions made about the probability that the trader is informed vary. One frequent
supposition, which we adopt here, is that the market maker knows, somehow, through the
previous history of trading, the proportion of traders who are informed (say, ); accordingly,
that ratio is used as the probability that the next trader will be informed. As noted above,
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we make the largely standard assumption that everyone knows that any informed trader will
have received a signal of either type. In that situation, for example, the probability that the
next trader will be an informed trader who will buy the asset under a high signal, will be
p and the probability that he will purchase the asset when he has received a low signal will
equal (1  p): We assume that the uninformed trader will buy with probability  and sell with
probability . As also noted above, the market maker possesses no ner set of information than
the market, so that his priors for the value of the asset as trader t comes to the market must
be P [w = wh = 1 j Ht] = t1, and P [w = wl = 0 j Ht] = 1   t1; so we can write the ask price




t1(p+ (1  )) + (1  t1)((1  p) + (1  ))

: (6)
On similar assumptions, the bid price counterpart to equation (6) for the situation in which the
market trader determines his expectation of the assets value consequent upon his observing a
sale by the next trader is:
Bt =

t1((1  p) + (1  ))
t1((1  p) + (1  )) + (1  t1)(p+ (1  ))

: (7)
The market makers expected prot from a sale or a purchase must be zero by construction.
Thus, the arrival of a purchaser of the asset on the market at t of, for example, will give, :
E[(At   w)] = (At   E[w j bt])P (bt) = 0: (8)
Further, it is immediate that the ask (bid) price will increase (fall) when the proportion of
informed traders in the market () increases. Should the market maker, for example, make a
sale of the asset to trader t he will take At as his prior for the next trader that the value of the
asset is high (1) and so his new prior that the value is low (0) will be equal to 1 At:7
4 Modelling Ambiguity and CEU
We now outline single person decisions when there is ambiguity. Ambiguity is modelled by
non-additive beliefs and preferences are represented as a Choquet integral with respect to these








capacities and then turn our attention to neo-additive capacities and to CEU based upon them.
Throughout we use the following notation:
Notation We consider a nite set of states of nature S: The set of events is taken to be the
set of all subsets of S, which we denote by . The set of possible outcomes or consequences is
denoted by X. An act is a function from S to X. The set of all acts is denoted by A (S) :
4.1 Capacities and the Choquet Integral
A capacity generalises the notion of probability and assigns non-additive weights to events. We
use a special case of the Schmeidler model axiomatised by Chateauneuf, Eichberger and Grant
(2008), in which beliefs are represented as neo-additive capacities.
Denition 4.1 For (; ) 2 [0; 1] and given an additive probability  on S; dene a neo-
additive-capacity  by  (A) = + (1  ) (A) ; ; $ A $ S;  (?) = 0;  (S) = 1:
Chateauneuf, Eichberger and Grant (2008), show that the Choquet expected value of a
function f : S ! R with respect to the neo-additive capacity  is given by:
CEU(v) =
Z
fdv =   sup
s2S
(f) + (1  )  inf
s2S
(f) + (1  )E (f) :
The Choquet integral is like an expectation as it is a weighted sum of utilities. The weight
assigned to a state depends on how the outcome is "ranked".8 For a neo-additive capacity,
the Choquet integral is a weighted average of the highest payo¤, the lowest payo¤ and the
expected payo¤. The parameter  is a measure of ambiguity; and the parameter  measures the
individuals attitude to ambiguity. The neo-additive capacity is consistent with the observation
of Kilka and Weber (2001) that individuals tend to overweight highly likely and highly unlikely
events in their decision-making. It also accommodates both optimistic and pessimistic attitudes
to ambiguity. We can take optimism (pessimism) to prevail when the individual over-weights
the favourable (unfavourable) outcome: so here, pure optimism (pessimism) holds if  = 1
( = 0):
8Gilboa (1987), Schmeidler (1989) and Sarin and Wakker (1992) provide axiomatisations for CEU preferences.
Wakker (2001) characterises capacities representing ambiguity-averse or pessimistic attitudes of a decision maker.
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Intuitively, these preferences describe a situation in which agents have an underlying additive
belief. However, they lack condence in the latter. We can interpret the additive part of CEU ,
E (f) ; as the agents belief and (1  ) as his degree of condence in that belief.9
4.2 Up-dating Neo-additive Capacities
To apply CEU with neo-additive beliefs to a dynamic process, it is necessary to model how
agents update their beliefs upon the arrival of new information; and thence their CEU . Consider
rst the up-dating of the neo-additive capacity. We dene the capacity for any event, A given
the occurrence of any event F , using the Generalised Bayesian Updating rule axiomatised by
Eichberger, Grant and Kelsey (2007).10
Denition 4.2 Let v =  + (1  ) be a neo-additive capacity and let F be a subset of S:
Then if A is a non-empty subset of F we dene the updated neo-additive capacity F (A) by
F (A) =
8><>:
F + (1  F )F (A) if A $ F;
1 if A = F;
where F =
1
(1  ) (F ) +  and F (A) =
8><>:
 (A) = (F ) if  (F ) > 0;
0 if  (F ) = 0:
This rule has the advantage that the updated preferences can again be represented as a
Choquet integral with respect to a neo-additive capacity. Thus we remain within the original
class of preferences. A second advantage is that the updated capacity is itself a neo additive
capacity with the same : Thus the updating rule does not alter the decision-makers ambiguity
attitude but only updates beliefs.11
Lemma 4.1 The Choquet expected utility with respect to a conditional neo-additive capacity is,
CEU(vF ) = [1  F  ]EjF (f) + F (  sup f + (1  )  inf f) :
9When  = 1, these preferences coincide with the Hurwicz (1951) criterion (axiomatised in Arrow and Hurwicz
(1972)).
10This up-dating rule is: vF (A) =
v(A\F )
v(A\F )+v(Ac\F ) where: v(A
c \ F ) = 1   v(F c [ A); given the conjugate
capacity, v, dened as: v(F ) = 1  v(F c):
11Neither the Dempster-Shafer rule nor the Optimistic update shares this property.
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The proof is immediate. Note, the Choquet utility (here also expected value) of a random
variable with respect to any conditional neo-additive capacity is well dened even if the con-
ditioning event is an ex ante zero probability event, provided  > 0. More generally, the more
unlikely (in terms of the additive prior) is the event, the less condence (the lower is 1 F )
the individual has in the additive part of the theoryand the more weight (the greater F is ) he
places on extremeoutcomes (depending upon his degree of ambiguity and his attitude to it).
A consistent signal (F = E) reduces condence less than does an inconsistent signal (F 6= E).
5 Herd and Contrarian Behaviour
5.1 Denitions
We adopt essentially the same denition of herding and contrarian behaviour as Avery and
Zemsky (1998). However, we cannot state the denitions in exactly the same way because we
work with the actual trading prices (bid and ask) of the market trader, rather than the markets
expectation of the value of the asset. Formally, we dene herd behaviour as:
Denition 5.1
1. Given a positive history of prices, so that t1 > 
0
1, should trader t have received a low
private signal x = l, he will engage in a herd buy if EtT;x=l(w) > E(A
t).
2. Given a negative history of trades, t1 < 
0
1; should trader t have received a high private
signal x = h, he will engage in a herd sell if EtT;x=h(w) < E(B
t).
Here, for example: EtT;x=l(w) represents the informed traders expected value of the asset,
or its EUT or CEUT , whichever happens to constitute his decision rule, at t given the signal
x = l. Concomitantly, we dene contrarian behaviour as:
Denition 5.2
1. Given a positive history of trades, t1 > 
0
1, should trader t have received a high private
signal x = h, he will engage in contrarian selling if EtT;x=h(w) < B
t.
2. Given a negative history of trades, t1 < 
0
1, should trader t have received a low private
signal x = l, he will engage in contrarian buying if EtT;x=l(w) > A
t.
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In e¤ect, an informed trader will engage in herd behaviour when, for whatever reason he,
as it were, overrides what his private signal is indicating about the value of the asset, and
trades in line with market sentiment. Such a trader will engage in contrarian behaviour when
he discounts his private signal to trade against the market trend.12 We note that this overriding
of the private signal is the denition of an informational cascade.
5.2 Analysis of Trading with CEU
We now turn to study in detail how di¤erences in the information, beliefs, and concomitant
assessments of the assets value between the MM and informed traders can generate di¤erent
trading behaviour and prices. It will be recalled that the market maker possesses the same
information set as is publicly available (the past history of trading prices, be they ask or bid
prices, plus the knowledge that informed traders exist and receive high and low signals). Con-
sequently, to reiterate this, the market expectation of the value of the asset at time t is the
probability that the value of the asset will be 1, namely, t1:
Any informed trader will update that price/market expected value of the asset, consequent
upon his receiving any private signal. From Bayesrule the updated belief about that value,
namely, the probability that w = 1 (given that we can ignore the other value of w = 0)
conditional on the type of signal is: 13
(wjx) =
8>><>>:










If the traders objective is to maximise the expected utility of the asset, then that utility or value
will be given by xh (w), for a high signal and xl (w) for a low signal in equation (9).
12Such behaviour has been labelled by Chari and Kehoe (2003) as generating one of "waves of optimism
and pessimism" rather than of herd behaviour. However, logically our denitions do, indeed, dene herd and
contrarian behaviour by a given trader; if it happens that a sequence of informed traders all appear over a period
and they have all receive high signals then should the circumstances delineated in (i) of Denition (5.1), this will
coincide with a boom in prices and what seems like a wave of optimism. But it is not necessarily the case that
the latter is prevalent in the market from the observed trades; and, under (i) of Denition (5.1) there will not be
optimism in the market in the usual sense, since low signals have been received by the traders.
13As noted, when w = 0, there is no need to gure out 1 (0) and 0 (0), since they do not appear in any of
the expected value (utility) formulations.
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However, should the traders objective be to maximise his Choquet expected value of the
asset, we need to formulate his CEUT (w) based on his up-dated neo-additive beliefs. Denote
by vx (w) the conditional neo-additive belief of w given x, then it follows from Denition 4.2
and Lemma 4.1 that the informed traders CEU is:
CEUT (vx) = (1  x)Ejx (f) + x (  sup f + (1  )  inf f) ; (10)
where, in our framework, sup f = 1 and inf f = 0. Here, for example: Ejx (f) is the upper
expression in (9) when the high signal is received (x = 1); x is given by F in Denition 4.2
where, of course, x = F ; and, x is the same for both the high and low signals since they have
identical probabilities of occurrence (Table 1).
We show how the perceived uncertainty of informed traders can generate contrarian and
herd behaviour in the market.
(1) With a private signal but no ambiguity in the perceptions of informed traders there is
neither herd nor contrarian behaviour.
The traders action now depends upon his EUs or the expected values of the asset, given
by the rst and second expressions in equation (9) for the "Bullish" signal and the "Bearish"
signal, respectively. Those expressions are, respectively, concave and convex with respect to
t1.
14 We observe that they have identical magnitudes at, respectively, t1 = 0 and 
t
1 = 1: Now,
consider how EUT;h(w) and EUT;l(w) relate, respectively, to At and Bt. Take, for example, the
relationship between EUT;h(w) (equation (9) and At (equation (6)). They have identical values
at, respectively, t1 = 0 and 
t
1 = 1;and EUT;h(w) must lie above A
t at all intermediate values
of t1 since:
EUTx=h(w) > A
t as 1 < 2p (11)
and the right hand inequality must hold since p > 1=2: The bid price (equation (7)) must lie
entirely above that of EUT;l(w) on that same condition, since:
Bt > EUTx=l(w) as : 1 < 2p: (12)
Accordingly, given the receipt of a high (low) signal by the informed trader he will always













< 0; where: z  pt1 +
(1  p) (1  t1) > 0; p > 1=2:
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(risen) consistently, the informed trader will not ignore his high (low) signal and engage in herd
selling (buying); neither will he engage in contrarian behaviour.
In e¤ect, when E [wjx = l] < Bt < E(wt) = t1 < At < E [wjx = h], we have a situa-
tion where the private signals are monotonic, as dened by Avery and Zemsky (1998). With
monotonic signals the market has complete information about the probability of (its own) ex-
pected value of the asset, since the market can deduce the probability of the two possible values
of the asset, 01, for w = 1; and 1  01, for w = 0.
(2) With a private signal and informed trader ambiguity: Herd and Contrarian behaviour.
For the informed trader the choice of action on the market is given by his CEU(w) under
the receipt of either signal compared with the ask (equation (6)) and bid (equation (7)) prices.
For the "Bullish" signal "Bearish" signal, respectively, these are:
CEUT;xh (w) = [1  x] Ejxh + x: (13)
CEUT;xl (w) = [1  x] Ejxl + x: (14)
In equations (13) and (14), we reiterate that the conditional expectations are given in equation
(9), and x is given by Denition 4.2, and it takes the same value independently of which signal
is received, since the probability of either signal is p (from Table 1).
We can state this Proposition on herd behaviour :
For given ; , for informed traders there exist q; q such that:
Proposition 5.1 If  2 [0; q] ; with a recent history of rising  over that range, as a conse-
quence of a sequence of rising transactions prices, an informed trader who, having received a
low signal, is selected to trade on the market at t, will herd buy with positive probability. Re-
spectively, If  2 [q; 1] ; with a recent history of falling  over that range, as a consequence of
a sequence of falling transactions prices, an informed trader who, having received a high signal,
is selected to trade on the market at t, will herd sell with positive probability.
Proof. Consider (1). Note that potentially the actions of traders, uniformed as well as
informed, with the latter in receipt of perhaps varying signals, can move the price, and hence,
 for any t, to anywhere in the range 0 to 1. In addition, as demonstrated above, with p > 1=2,
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that At >  > Bt. Now, assume that prices and the markets expectation of the value of
the asset have been raising over the stated range in recent trades. Then, when a low signal
is received, the trader will buy the asset provided that equation (14) lies above At (equation
(6))over the range of  from 0 up to q, at which value latter value it intersects At: That
outcome must arise because: (i) the value of equation (14) at t1 = 0 is x, whilst that of
At = 0;(ii) At is concave, whilst equation (14) is convex, in t1; and, (iii) the value of equation
(14) at t1 = 1 is 1  x(1 ) = [(1  )p+]=[(1  )p+ ], which is lower than 1; the value
of At: Accordingly, equation (14) must lie above At for some "low" values of t1, below it for
some "high" values of t1, and hence intersect at some "intermediate" value of 
t
1:Conrmation















(kt1 + r(1  t1))3
< 0; (15)
k = p+ (1  p) > 0; r = (1  p) + (1  ); k > r (16)
@CEUT;xl(w)
@t1
= [1  x]: p(1  p)








= [1  x]: 2p(1  p)(2p  1)
[(1  p)t1 + p(1  t1)]3
> 0: (18)
Now consider (2). To prove this, equation (13), it must be possible for the traders CEU
consequent upon receipt of a high signal, equation (13), to lie below the market makers bid
price, Bt; over the stated price range. So that at some at  = qthey must intersect, and as
the price rises towards 1, equation (13) must lie below Bt: This is possible because: (i) as with
equation (14), equation (13) has a value at t1 = 0 of x, whilst B
t has a value of 0, like
At;(ii) at t1 = 1, equation (14) shares the same value as equation (13), 1  x(1  );which is
lower than 1, the value of Bt: Consequently, equation (13) and Bt must intersect at some value
of t1between 0 and 1, since both equations are continuous in 
t
1: B
t is convex, and equation
















(at1 + b(1  t1))3
> 0: (19)
a = (1  p) + (1  ); b = p+ (1  ); a < b
@CEUT;xh(w)
@t1
= [1  x]: p(1  p)








= [1  x]: 2p(p  1)
[(1  p)t1 + p(1  t1)]3
< 0 (21)

Proposition 5.2 is illustrated in Figure 1, where  is given by the 45 line. In constructing
Figure 1 these parameter values have been assumed for the Choquet Expected Utility, bid and
ask equations:  = 0:5;  = 0:6;  = 0:5;  =  = 1=3 (so implying that there is probability of
1=3 that the uninformed trader will not trade), and p = 0:7:15 Equation (14) intersects At at
 = q = 0:288848; and, equation (13) and Bt intersect at  = q = 0:743409: The probability
values nand n are referred to in the following text.
Proposition 5.2 gives rise to several corollaries, of which the following are the most pertinent:
Corollary 5.1 Price ranges will exist for the high and low signal over which the informed trader
will not trade.
Proof. Assume that a high signal has been received. There will be a price range over which the
trader will neither sell nor buy the asset. That price range must lie between the intersection of
equation (13) with At (say, n) and Bt (the value q, already established above). Given that
At > Bt, except at t1 = 0 or 1, and the properties of equation (13) established in Proposition
5.2, it follows that equation (13) intersects both At at a lower value that it does Bt. So, equation
(13) lies below At and above Bt for t1 2 [n; q].
Now, let a low signal be received. It follows from the proof of Proposition 5.2, since equation
(14) intersects At, at q, it must intersect Bt, and at some n = t1 > q:Therefore, for t1
15We note that these values of  and  are compatible with the experimental results of Kilka and Weber (2001).
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2 [q; n], the Choquet Expected Utility of the trader, given a low signal, lies below the ask
price and above the bid price. 
Corollary 5.2 A ceteris paribus reduction in the informed traders attitude to ambiguity ()
will increase (reduce) the range of prices over which he will engage in herd selling (buying).
Proof : Our focus is the values of q and q: From equations (13) and (14) we note that
a reduction in  will lower the (identical) value of CEUT;xh (w) and CEUT;xl (w) at 
t
1 = 1
and also at t1 = 0: since at those respective values of 
t
1; the Choquet Expected Utilities are,
1  x(1  ) and x: Consequently, CEUT;xh (w) must intersect Bt at a lower value of t1
than it did previously (q); and, likewise, CEUT;xl (w) intersect A
t, at a lower value of t1 than
hitherto (q). Therefore, the price range over which herd selling will occur increase, whilst that
over which herd buying will occur will fall. 
Corollary 5.3 A ceteris paribus increase in the informed traders degree of ambiguity () will
increase the range of prices over which he will engage in herd selling and buying.
Proof. An increase in the value of  will increase the (identical) value of CEUT;xh (w) and
CEUT;xl (w) at 
t
1 = 0, and lower it at 
t
1 = 1:At 
t
1 = 0, CEU = [(1   )p + ] 1: Hence:
@CEU=@ = p[(1   )p + ] 2 > 0: At t1 = 1; CEU = [(1   p) + ]=[(1   )p + ]; hence,
@CEU=@ = p(   1)[(1   )p + ] 2 < 0; given (; ) 2 [0; 1]: Therefore, CEUT;xh (w) must
intersect Bt at a lower value of t1 than it did previously; whilst, CEUT;xl (w) must intersect A
t
at a higher value. Hence, in terms of Proposition (5.2), q declines and qincreases. The price
range over which herd selling and buying can occur will increase. 
Corollary 5.4 In the absence of a bid-ask spread, so that the market maker sets the bid and ask
prices at t1, the range of prices over which herd selling and buying will occur will be increased.
Proof. At any given value of t1; A
t > t1 > B
t:Consequently, when these three prices are
identical, it must follow that after the receipt of a high signal, CEUT;xh (w) must intersect 
t
1,
the new price, at a lower value of t1 than that at which it intersects B
t:The q of Proposition
(5.2) will fall. When a low signal is received, CEUT;xl (w) must intersect 
t
1; the new bid price
at a higher value t1 than that at which it intersected A
t: The range over which the informed
trade will engage in herd buying has increased. The qof Proposition (5.2) will increase.
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Consequent upon Proposition 5.2 contrarian behaviour can also arise under ambiguity and
CEU preferences, and we can state the following Proposition:
Proposition 5.2 For given ; , for informed traders there exist q; q such that:
1. If  2 [q; 1] ; with a recent history of rising  over that range, and with a high signal,
contrarian selling occurs with positive probability.
2. If  2 [0; q] ; with a recent history of falling  over that range, and with a low signal,
contrarian buying occurs with positive probability.
Proof : This follows directly from that for Proposition 5.2 with price histories reversed. 
Proposition 5.2 obviously admits of three companion corollaries to Corollary 5.2, Corollary
5.3 and Corollary 5.4, with proofs clearly identical, mutatis mutandis, to those of the three
earlier corollaries:
Corollary 5.5 A ceteris paribus reduction in the informed traders attitude to ambiguity ()
will increase (reduce) the range of prices over which he will engage in contrarian selling (buying).
Corollary 5.6 A ceteris paribus increase in the informed traders degree of ambiguity () will
increase the range of prices over which he will engage in contrarian selling and buying.
Corollary 5.7 In the absence of a bid-ask spread, contrarian buying and selling will occur over
a wider price range.
The propositions demonstrate that informational ambiguity can be the cause of herding and
contrarian behaviour. The corollaries give consistent and supportive claims that herding and
contrarian behaviour are more likely to occur when there is greater ambiguity about information
received. Greater optimism (larger ) encourages herd/contrarian buying and greater pessimism
(larger 1  ) encourages herd/contrarian selling.
6 Heuristics on: Asset Prices and Reversing Herd Selling
It is not our objective here to attempt to track over time (traders), bid, ask, and the transactions
prices of the asset. However, using just two further traders, we set out an illustrative sequence
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of those prices, to show, herd sell behaviour (an asset price "crash") could be terminated, and
by an informed trader, with a "high" level of optimism (). We assume an uninformed trader
appears next on the market and is followed by an informed trader.
Thus, take as starting point, the market and trading situation that occurs at time t; as
set-out in the second part of Proposition 5.2, when trader t decides to engage in herd selling.
Accordingly, in our framework, this means that the market maker will set his new expected
value of the asset (e¤ectively, that it will be 1) at Bt, which will be his prior for setting his bid
and ask prices ready for t+1; with (1 Bt) being his prior that the expected value of the asset






2 + (1  t1)b2

; a = (1  p) + (1  ); b = p+ (1  ): (22)




kat1 + rb(1  t1)

; k = p  (1  ); r = (1  p) + (1  ): (23)
In accord with our assumption about the arrival on the market of a specic type of trader,
trader t + 1 is an uninformed trader. Assume that for whatever reason, perhaps because he
views the market as being in a general decline, that he also sells the asset. The transaction
price (in, we may say, at time t + 1) will then again be the bid price. Up-dating equation(22)

















In the circumstances the rational market maker has reduced both his ask and bid prices.
That this is clear for the ask price from a comparison of equations(6), (23), and (25), since that
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b > a; and, given the latter, for the bid price from a comparison of equations (7), (22), and
(24).
Trader t+2 is an informed trader. The markets prior probability that the assets value will
be 1, will be equal to the Bt+1, the transaction price for t + 1. He will up-date that by one
or other of the expressions in equation(9), depending upon the type of signal he has received.





2 + (1  p)(1  t1)b2
(26)
Then the decision to trade) depends upon the ambiguity () and the attitude to it () of the
trader. As ! 1, and  ! 0, ap > b(1 p), the probability increases that the informed traders
CEU will exceed At+2. Thus, using equation(13) and replacing Ejxl with equation(26), we
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The parameters a; b; k and r, are dened in equation(22) and equation(23). Following the





















 ) ap > b(1  p)
(28)
Hence, as  ! 0, "! 1, it is probable that the informed traders CEU will exceed At+2. Take
the values that we have assumed in our numerical example for the parameters that determine a
and b:  = 0:5;  =  = 1=3. Then: a = r = (19=60); b = k = (31=60): We assume, in line with
that example, that the initial t1must exceed 0:743409, given by the point q
 on Figure 1. So
let it be 0:75: then, At+2 = 0:647727, and the traders CEU will be:
CEUT;xh =
(1  )p:(0:724484) + 
(1  )p+  ! 0:724484 : as  ! 0 (29)
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Recalling that in our numerical example, p = 0:7, At+2 = 0:647727. Therefore, CEUT;xh >
At+2 when: 0:0537299 > (0:70147   ): So, no matter what the value of  happens to be, if
  0:70147, so that the informed traders ambiguity attitude is high, in excess of our informed
trader who herd sold at the "initial" price of t1 = 0:75, whose ambiguity parameter was 0:5.
The price of the asset has been falling consistently for several periods (over the appearance of
several traders) and is down to 0:529843 (Bt+1at the given parameter values, a; b, p = 0:7, and
t1 = 0:75) before the t + 2 trader arrives on the market. That trader does not "discount" his
high signal to an extent which stops him from following that high view about the assets value.
The downslide in the market has been halted.
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7 Concluding observations: Money Pumps and Dynamic Con-
sistency
We have re-examined herding behaviour in a nancial market where trade is sequential and
prices of assets are endogenously determined. To investigate the e¤ects of ambiguity in nancial
markets, we modelled agentsbeliefs as neo-additive capacities and their preference as CEU .
We have demonstrated that herd and contrarian behaviour can be rational for informed traders
facing ambiguity and with ambiguity attitudes that condition their trading strategy on the
market. Such contrarian behaviour, for example, can terminate a price bubble. Additionally,
there is greater scope for situations where informed traders can be seen, rationally, not to trade,
so causing the market to break down.
The approach that we take in this paper to the modelling of informational ambiguity and
attitudes to it is one that has support from the literature on the psychology of decision-making
and associated laboratory experiments. It is an approach that does not need the various in-
formational structures that are used in the inuential study of Avery and Zemsky (1998). Of
itself, it formally only requires the notion which underlies all the literature in this eld, that of
value uncertainty.
The nance literature o¤ers support for our approach, even though empirical studies of
herding and contrarian behaviour have not provided clear support for any of the competing
rationalisations of such behaviour. For example, in a recent paper Zhang (2006) found that
the level of ambiguity (either uncertainty about the fundamental volatility or about the quality
of information) perceived about a rm by an investor is positively related to the return of
herd tradings on its stocks in US markets. Also, in a substantial earlier study, we note that
Lakonishok et al (1994) found that a contrarian trading strategy performs better for smaller
rms than for larger rms. Information about smaller rms and their prospects/stock returns is
likely to be less in quantity and quality (more uncertain/ambiguous) than that which is available
to investors in larger rms.
Now, it is often argued that individuals who deviate from subjective EU are subject to so
called money pumps. In other words such individuals will persistently lose money in nancial
markets and hence their inuence will can be neglected in the long run. These arguments do
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not apply to the traders in our model. We note that CEU preferences satisfy all the standard
microeconomic rationality conditions, i.e. they are complete, reexive, transitive, and respect
state-wise dominance. Thus individuals with such preferences cannot be disadvantaged in a
static context for the usual reasons. Any inconsistencies must arise from the interaction of the
dynamic aspects of the model and the way in which preferences are updated as new information
is received.
We consider individuals who have CEU preferences and use the GBU updating rule. Neces-
sary and su¢ cient conditions for dynamic consistency in this context have been found in (Eich-
berger, Grant and Kelsey (2005)). These conditions are not satised by neo-additive capacities,
hence in principle violations of dynamic consistency are possible in our model. However, these
potential dynamic inconsistencies are not important in practice.
Consider the traders. Dynamic consistency issues are not relevant for the uninformed
traders, since they only trade once and do not update their beliefs. To be subject to a money
pump an individual must make at least two trades. Each informed trader also only trades once
and thus cannot be dynamically inconsistent in the sense of losing money or of choosing a dom-
inated option. It is possible that such traders may be dynamically inconsistent in the weaker
sense that they may make a trade which they would not have chosen at time zero. There is
no a priori reason why traders who exhibit this weak kind of dynamic inconsistency should not
exist in markets since they will not tend to lose money even in the long run.
Consider the market makers. They are the only repeated traders in the market. Such
individuals are potentially vulnerable to a money pump. However since the market makers
have standard additive beliefs in our model, money pumps are not possible in practice. This is
the reason that we assume that the decisions of market-makers are not a¤ected by ambiguity.
We believe that it would be possible to extend our framework to a situation in which
agents execute multiple trades over time, whist retaining dynamic consistency. In a recent
paper Epstein and Schneider (2003) have axiomatised recursive multiple prior preferences, which
are dynamically consistent and compatible with ambiguity aversion. Hannay and Klibano¤
(2007) suggest an alternative way to extend multiple preferences to an intertemporal context.
Their preferences are dynamically consistent but violate consequentalism. We conjecture that
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a more complex model of herding could be developed with either of these models. However,
we believe that our result that herding is more likely with ambiguous signals would remain
true. Moreover, in such a model, traders would be dynamically consistent in the strong sense
of always implementing their initial plans.
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